A dynamical system is a pair (X, f ), where X is a topological space and f : X → X is continuous. Kremer observed that the language of propositional linear temporal logic can be interpreted over the class of dynamical systems, giving rise to a natural intuitionistic temporal logic. We introduce a variant of Kremer's logic, which we denote ITL c ♦ , and show that it is decidable. We also show that minimality and Poincaré recurrence are both expressible in the language of ITL c ♦ , thus providing a decidable logic expressive enough to reason about non-trivial asymptotic behavior in dynamical systems.
Introduction
Dynamical (topological) systems are mathematical models of change or movement over time. Formally, they are structures of the form X = (X, T , f ), where (X, T ) is a topological space and f : X → X is a continuous function [1] . This rather broad definition allows them to be found in multiple disciplines, including mathematics, physics and biology. The theory of such systems can be readily formalized in standard mathematical foundations such as set theory, or even second-order arithmetic, but these are undecidable and subject to Gödel's incompleteness theorems [25] . On the other hand, Gödel's proof relies on number-theoretic considerations which are not necessarily relevant to the study of dynamical systems. In view of this, the dynamic topological logic project aimed to develop a logical framework for formal reasoning about dynamical systems, which was decidable and complete yet powerful enough to prove non-trivial theorems. Unfortunately, the project was set back by a series of negative results, including the undecidability of full dynamic topological logic (DTL), leading to a search for decidable variants of DTL which remained expressive enough for its intended applications. Our goal in this paper is to present such a variant. Following a suggestion of Kremer, we recast dynamic topological logic as an intuitionistic temporal logic, and show it to be a decidable logic powerful enough to reason about non-trivial recurrence phenomena in arbitrary dynamical systems.
1.1. Dynamic topological logic. As observed by Artemov et al. [3] , it is possible to reason about dynamical systems within modal logic; the topological structure can be represented via a modality, which we will denote , interpreted as an interior operator in the sense of Tarski [42] , while the action of f can be captured by a temporal-like modality, which we will denote •. They introduced the logic S4C, and proved that it is decidable, as well as sound and complete for the class of all dynamical systems. Kremer and Mints [32] considered a similar logic, called S4H, and also showed it to be sound and complete for the class of dynamical systems where f is a homeomorphism.
The latter also suggested adding the 'henceforh' operator, , from linear temporal logic (LTL) [35] . This allowed them to represent asymptotic phenomena, including the non-trivial Poincaré recurrence theorem, which we discuss in §11.2. The resulting tri-modal system was called dynamic topological logic (DTL), and the positive results concerning S4C and S4H led to the expectation that DTL may also be well-behaved, possibly leading to applications in e.g. specialized computer-assisted proof. Unfortunately, it was soon shown by Konev et al. that dynamic topological logic is undecidable over the class of all dynamical systems [28] . Although the axiomatization of DTL proposed in [32] is incomplete [22] , we later provided a sound and complete axiomatization [21] . However, Konev et al. showed that DTL over the class of dynamical systems with a homeomorphism is not even computably enumerable [29] .
This led to a search for decidable variants of DTL which retained the capacity for reasoning about the asymptotic behavior of dynamical systems. Gabelaia et al. [23] proposed dynamic topological logics with finite, but unbounded, time and showed them to be decidable, although not in primitive recursive time. Kremer instead proposed a restriction to dynamical systems where the topology is a partition [31] , while we considered interpretations over minimal systems, which we will discuss in §11.1; the DTL's obtained in the latter two cases are decidable.
However, as a general rule, all of the decidable variants of DTL with continuous functions that are currently known are obtained by either restricting the class of dynamical systems over which they are interpreted, or restricting the logics to reason about finitely many iterations of f .
1 This makes them unsuitable to capture asymptotic behavior of arbitrary dynamical systems, which motivated interest in DTL.
1.2.
Intuitionistic dynamic topological logic. Meanwhile, there is another variation of DTL which does not have either of these restrictions, yet whose decidability was never settled: Kremer's intuitionistic version of DTL, proposed in unpublished work [30] , and here denoted ITL c . It is well-known that propositional intuitionistic logic can be seen as a fragment of S4 via the Gödel-Tarski translation [42] (see §4 for details), and indeed the two share very similar semantics. In particular, intuitionistic logic can be interpreted topologically. One can use this idea to present a version of dynamic topological logic which removes the modality , and instead interprets implication intuitionistically. A feature of such semantics is that all formulas are interpreted by open sets, and as Kremer observed, the truth condition for •ϕ will preserve the openness of the truth valuation when f is a continuous function. On the other hand, Kremer also observed that the classical truth condition for ϕ did not always produce open sets, and thus he proposed to take the interior of this classical interpretation (see §3 for details).
We will follow Kremer in using intuitionistic temporal logic to reason about dynamical systems, but we will replace by 'eventually', denoted ♦; note that the two are not inter-definable intuitionistically [4] . Working with ♦ is convenient because the classical interpretation of ♦ϕ will indeed yield open sets. We will also add a universal modality, and call the resulting logic ITL c ♦ (Intuitionistic Temporal Logic of Continuous functions).
Intuitionistic temporal logics. The logic ITL
c is not the first intuitionistic variant of temporal logic. Ewald considered intuitionistic logic with 'past' and 'future' tenses [17] , and Davies suggested an intuitionistic temporal logic with • [13] , which was endowed with Kripke semantics and a complete deductive system by Kojima and Igarashi [27] . Logics with •, over bounded time were later studied by Kamide and Wansing [26] , and over infinite time by Nishimura [38] , who provided a sound and complete axiomatization for an intuitionistic variant of propositional dynamic logic PDL. For logics with •, ♦, , Balbiani and Diéguez [5] axiomatized the 'here-and-there' variant of LTL, and with Boudou and Diéguez we showed that intuitionistic LTL over expanding frames, denoted ITL e , is decidable [10] . Each of these logics use semantics based on bi-relational models for intuitionistic modal logic, studied systematically by Simpson [41] . Topological semantics for modal logic in general, and for temporal logic with 'past' and 'future' in particular, have also been studied by Davoren et al. [14, 15] .
Layout. The layout of the article is as follows.
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Binary Relations and Topology
In this section we establish some of the notation we will use and recall some basic notions from topology. In particular, we discuss Aleksandroff spaces, which link partial orders and topological spaces.
2.1. Sets and relations. We follow fairly standard conventions for sets and relations, which we briefly outline for reference.
The first infinite ordinal will be denoted ω, the cardinality of a set A will be denoted #A, and its powerset will be denoted P(A). For a binary relation R ⊆ A × B and X ⊆ A, we write R(X), or simply RX, for {y ∈ B : ∃x ∈ X x R y}, and we write R −1 for the inverse of R, that is, {(y, x) ∈ B × A : (x, y) ∈ R}. We write dom(R) for R −1 (B) and rng(R) for R(A). R is total if dom(R) = A, and surjective if rng(R) = B.
For any X ⊆ A, we define the restriction of R to X by R ↾ X = R ∩ (X × B), except when A = B, in which case R ↾ X = R∩(X ×X). If, moreover, S ⊆ B ×C, the composition of R and S is S • R ⊆ A × C, which we may sometimes denote SR. If B = A (so that R ⊆ A × A), recall that R is (a) reflexive, if for every x ∈ A, x R x; (b) antisymmetric, if for every x, y ∈ A, if x R y and y R x, then x = y; (c) transitive, if for every x, y ∈ A, if x R y and y R z, then x R z; (d) linear, if, for all x, y ∈ A, either x R y or y R x; and (e) serial, if for every x ∈ A there is y ∈ A such that x R y. A transitive, reflexive relation is a preorder and a transitive, reflexive, antisymmetric relation is a partial order.
A poset is a pair A = (|A|, A ), where |A| is any set and A ⊆ |A| × |A| is a partial order; we will generally adopt the convention of denoting the domain of a structure A by |A|. If X ⊆ |A|, A ↾ X is the structure obtained by restricting each element of A to X. Define ↓ A a = {b : b A a} and ↑ A a = {b : b A a}. We will generally write , ↓, ↑ instead of A , ↓ A , ↑ A when this does not lead to confusion. We will also use the notation a ≺ b for a b but b a, while a ≺ 1 b means that a ≺ b and there is no c ∈ |A| such that a ≺ c ≺ b. An element a ∈ |A| is greatest if b a for all b ∈ |A|, and maximal if b ≻ a for any b ∈ |A|. Least and minimal are defined analogously.
A partial order A is a tree if it has a greatest element r, and for every x ∈ |A|, ↑ x is finite and linearly ordered. Note that in our presentation, the leaves of a tree are its minimal elements.
2.2.
Notions from topology. Here we recall the basic definitions from topology we will use, including Aleksandroff spaces, which link topological spaces and partial orders. A more in-depth introduction can be found in a standard text such as [37] . Definition 2.1. A topological space is a pair X = (|X|, T X ) , where |X| is a set and T X a family of subsets of |X| satisfying 
Similarly, we define the closure A as |X| \ (|X| \ A) • ; this is the smallest closed set containing A.
Perhaps the most standard example of a topological space is given by the real line R, where U ⊆ R is open if, whenever x ∈ U , there is ε > 0 such that (x − ε, x + ε) ⊆ U . More generally, let (X, d) be a metric space; that is, d :
and say that U ⊆ X is open if, for all x ∈ U , there is ε > 0 such that B ε (x) ⊆ U . The Euclidean spaces R n are all examples of metric spaces and are always assumed to be equipped with the topology we have just defined, as is the set of rational numbers, denoted Q. The set of open balls on a metric space is a basis for its topology, in the following sense: Definition 2.2. A collection B of subsets of a set X is a basis if (1) B∈B B = X, and (2) whenever B 0 , B 1 ∈ B and x ∈ B 0 ∩ B 1 , there exists B 2 ⊆ B 0 ∩ B 1 such that x ∈ B 2 . The basis B generates a topology on X defined by letting U ⊆ X be open if and only if, for every x ∈ U , there is B ∈ B with x ∈ B ⊆ U .
Topological spaces can also be seen as a generalization of posets. If W is a poset, consider the topology D on |W| given by setting U ⊆ |W| to be open if and only if, whenever w ∈ U , we have ↓ w ⊆ U (so that the sets of the form ↓ w provide a basis for D ). We call D the down-set topology of . Similarly, the family of upwards-closed subsets of |W| will be denoted by U , and is the up-set topology of . Topologies of this form are Aleksandroff topologies [2] : Definition 2.3. A topological space A is an Aleksandroff space if any one of the following equivalent conditions occurs:
(1) whenever O ⊂ T A , then O ∈ T A ; (2) every x ∈ |A| has a ⊆-least neighborhood; (3) there is a preorder on |A| such that T A = D , or (4) there is a preorder on |A| such that T A = U .
It is readily verified that if T A = D , then is uniquely defined, 2 and we will denote it by A . We remark that intuitionistic logic cannot distinguish between preordered sets and partially ordered sets, so without loss of generality we may work only with Aleksandroff spaces generated by a poset. We will tacitly identify (|A|, A ) with (|A|, T A ).
Observe that all finite topological spaces are Aleksandroff; in fact, all locally finite spaces are Aleksandroff. The following is easily verified: Lemma 2.4. Say that a topological space A is locally finite if every point of |A| has a neighborhood U such that #U < ω. Then, if A is locally finite, it follows that A is Aleksandroff.
It is also useful to characterize the continuous functions on a poset: Lemma 2.5. If W, V are preorders and g : |W| → |V|, then g is continuous with respect to the down-set topologies on W, V if and only if, whenever v W w, it follows that g(v) V g(w).
In other words, continuous maps on posets are simply monotone maps. Aleksandroff spaces will be very useful to us throughout the text, as our goal is to reduce intuitionistic temporal logic over arbitrary dynamical systems to a computably bounded set of finite structures. With this, we are ready to define the logics that we are interested in.
Syntax and Semantics
In this section we will introduce the logic ITL c ♦ and its semantics; in fact, we will first define an extended logic ITL c , containing both our logic and Kremer's logic ITL c . Fix a countably infinite set P of propositional variables. Then, the full (intuitionistic temporal) language L I is defined by the grammar (in Backus-Naur form)
where p ∈ P. Here, • is read as 'next', ♦ as 'eventually', and as 'henceforth'. We also use ∼ϕ as a shorthand for ϕ ⇒ ⊥ and ϕ ⇔ ψ as a shorthand for (ϕ ⇒ ψ) ∧ (ψ ⇒ ϕ).
Denote the set of subformulas of ϕ ∈ L I by sub(ϕ), and the length of ϕ (or, more precisely, #sub(ϕ)) by ϕ . We will also be interested in certain sublanguages of L I , which only allow some set of modalities M ⊆ {•, ♦, , ∃, ∀}, and we will denote such a fragment by L I ↾ M . Note that L I ↾ M always contains all Booleans, even though they will not be listed in M . We will be primarily interested in the language L I ♦ = L I ↾ {•, ♦, ∀}. We will interpret formulas of L I on dynamical systems over topological spaces, or dynamical topological systems. Definition 3.1. A dynamical (topological) system is a triple X = (|X|, T X , f X ), where (|X|, T X ) is a topological space and f X : |X| → |X| is a continuous function.
A valuation on X is a function · :
A dynamical system X equipped with a valuation · X is a (dynamical topological) model.
Note that, for a propositional variable p, p can be any subset of |X|, provided it is open. The rest of the clauses are standard from either intuitionistic or temporal logic, with the exception of ϕ. The interpretation of the latter is due to Kremer, and we will discuss it further in the next section.
As a general convention, we let structures inherit the properties of their components, so that for example an Alexandroff model is a model A such that (|A|, T A ) is an Aleksandroff space. In the setting of Aleksandroff models, the semantics for implication simplify somewhat.
Lemma 3.2. Let A be a model based on an Aleksandroff space, and ϕ be any formula. Then,
Proof. For the first claim, observe that if x ∈ E ⊆ |A|, then x ∈ E • if and only if ↓ x ⊆ E. From this and the definition of ϕ ⇒ ψ A , the claim follows. The second claim is analogous, but replacing by . For the third, since in an Aleksandroff space we have that infinite intersections of open sets are open, it follows that n<ω f −n ϕ is open, and thus
Validity is then defined in the usual way:
Definition 3.3. Given a model X and a formula ϕ ∈ L I , we say that ϕ is valid on X, written X |= ϕ, if ϕ X = |X|. If X is a dynamical system, we write X |= ϕ if (X, · ) |= ϕ for every valuation · on X. If Ω is a class of dynamical systems or models, we say that ϕ ∈ L I is valid over Ω if, for every X ∈ Ω, X |= ϕ. We define the logics ITL c ♦ and ITL c to be the set of formulas of L I ♦ and L I , respectively, that are valid over the class of all dynamical systems.
One of the key differences between classical and intuitionistic logic has to do with the fact that any formula is classically equivalent to its double negation, but intuitionistically this need not be the case. To this end, it is convenient to elucidate the topological meaning of double negation.
Lemma 3.4. Let X be any model and ϕ ∈ L I . Then, ∼∼ϕ = ϕ
• ; that is, ∼∼ϕ is true precisely on the interior of the closure of ϕ .
We leave the proof to the reader; it can be a good exercise to familiarize oneself with the topological semantics of intuitionistic logic. As a corollary, we obtain the following fact, which will be useful throughout the text: given formulas ϕ, ψ and a model X, we have that X |= ϕ ⇒ ∼∼ψ if and only if ψ is dense in ϕ ; that is, if ϕ ⊆ ψ . In particular, 0 ∈ ∼∼p ⇒ p , showing that the latter formula is not intuitionistically valid.
Double negations will be useful in exhibiting a principle valid in Aleksandroff systems that is not valid in general.
Example 3.6. The formula
is valid on any model based on an Aleksandroff space. To see this, suppose that A is any such model with T A = D , and suppose that w ∈ ∀(p ∨ ∼p) A . Suppose further that w ∈ ∼∼♦p A . Then, there is v w such that v ∈ ♦p A , from which we obtain f n A (v) ∈ p A for some n.
But, we must have that f n A (w) ∈ p A as well; for otherwise, since f n A (v) f n A (w), we would have that f n A (w) ∈ p ∨ ∼p A , and hence w ∈ ∀(p ∨ ∼p) A , a contradiction. It follows that ϕ A = |A|, and thus ϕ is valid over the class of Aleksandroff dynamical systems.
However, as we will see later, the above formula ϕ is not valid over the class of all dynamical systems. Next, let us show that our full language can be simplified somewhat; in particular, it admits ∃-elimination.
Lemma 3.7. Given any model X and any formula ϕ, ∃ϕ X = ∼∀∼ϕ X .
Proof. Note that ∃ϕ X ∈ {∅, |X|}. If ∃ϕ X = ∅, then ϕ X = ∅, and thus ∼ϕ X = |X|. It follows that ∀∼ϕ X = |X|, and thus ∼∀∼ϕ X = ∅.
Otherwise, ∃ϕ X = |X|, which means that ϕ X = ∅. Hence ∼ϕ X = |X|; but then, ∀∼ϕ X = ∅, and thus ∼∀∼ϕ X = |X|.
Thus we may turn our attention to L I ↾ {•, ♦, , ∀}, or, generally speaking, to languages without ∃; however, we do want ∃ to be definable, as it will allow us to capture minimality (see §11.1). On the other hand, ∼∃∼ϕ is not always equivalent to ∀ϕ, nor can we define ♦, in terms of each other using the classical definitions.
Example 3.8. Consider a model (R, f, · ), where f is the constant function f (x) ≡ 0, and p = R \ {0}. Then, ∼p = ∅, since {0} has empty interior. It follows that ∼∃∼p = R. On the other hand, p = R, hence ∀p = R, and ∼∃∼p ⇔ ∀p is not valid.
By similar reasoning,
Finally, ∼p = ∅, hence ∼ ∼p = R. However, 0 ∈ ♦p , so that once again, ∼ ∼p ⇔ ♦p is not valid.
In fact, cannot be defined in terms of ♦, even over the class of Aleksandroff systems [4] , but we omit from our language for technical reasons that will be discussed later. Meanwhile, we have included ∀ in L I ♦ but not ∃; since the latter is definable, we lose nothing by omitting it.
Related Logics
Before we continue our analysis of ITL c ♦ , let us mention some related systems. First we observe that ITL c is an extension of the logic ITL c introduced by Kremer in [30] . To be precise, Kremer considers the language
There he also presents the next example, which will help elucidate the semantics of .
Example 4.1. Consider the dynamical system X where (|X|, T X ) is R with its usual topology, and f = f X : |X| → |X| is given by
Suppose that p = (−∞, 1).
Observe that, for all n, f n (0) = 0 ∈ p . Thus 0 ∈ n<ω f −n ϕ . Moreover, if x < 0, then x ∈ p and f (x) = 0, so once again x ∈ n<ω f −n ϕ .
On the other hand, if x > 0, then f n (x) = 2 n x. Since 2 n → ∞ as n → ∞, we have that, for n large enough, 2 n x > 1, and thus f n (x) ∈ p . It follows that x ∈ n<ω f −n ϕ . But then we have that
observe that this set is not open. Since intuitionistic truth values must always be open, we need to "approximate" it by an open set; this is done in the standard way by taking the interior, and thus
Kremer used Example 4.1 in [30] to prove the that several key principles of LTL fail intuitionistically. This shows that some care must be taken when working with , and as we will discuss in Example 5.4, the decidability proof we will present would not go through if we included it (at least not without some non-trivial modifications). Note, however, that in view of Lemma 3.2, this issue disappears when working over the class of Aleksandroff spaces.
Moreover, Aleksandroff spaces will allow us to compare our semantics with the expanding frames presented in Boudou et al. [10] . There, we use relational structures (W, , f ), where w v implies that f (w) f (v), and let w ∈ W satisfy ϕ ⇒ ψ if, whenever v w, if v satisfies ϕ, it also satisfies ψ; note that these are precisely the truth conditions with respect to the up-set topology U . Structures with these properties are similar to expanding products in modal logic [23] , and we will denote the logic of such frames over L I ♦ and L I by ITL e ♦ and ITL e , respectively. We proved in [10] that ITL e is decidable, with a similar superexponential bound as we will obtain for ITL 
This is proven by showing that ITL
e has the effective finite model property; as we will see, the same does not hold for ITL c ♦ , which is why we need to work instead with quasimodels (see §5).
In [10] , we also consider frames with the additional 'backward confluence' property • f ⊆ f • ; these systems are also considered in [27] , there called functional Kripke frames. We will follow [10] and call them persistent frames, since they are related to standard (persistent) products of modal logics [33] . The intuitionistic temporal logic of persistent frames is denoted ITL p . Backwards confluence may also be written as ↑f (w) ⊆ f [↑w]; in other words, f is an open map. Hence, expanding frames are precisely the Aleksandroff dynamical systems, and product frames are the Aleksandroff dynamical systems with an open map. It is immediate that ITL c ⊆ ITL e ⊆ ITL p ; in fact, both inclusions are strict. In Balbiani et al. [4] it is shown that (
and later we will show that ITL c ♦ = ITL e ♦ . Finally, it will be convenient to compare ITL c to dynamic topological logic. Since the base logic is classical, we may use a simpler syntax for DTL, using the language L C given by the grammar
We can then define ¬, ∧, ∨, , ♦ using standard classical validities. Since we will go back and forth between the classical and intuitionistic interpertations, we will always use ¬, → for classical logics and ∼, ⇒ for intuitionistic ones to avoid confusion.
Given a dynamical system, X, a classical valuation on X is a function
4 Note that in [10] we do not include a universal modality, but the proof of decidability can be readily modified to accommodate it.
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Booleans Modalities 
where ⊙ ∈ {∧, ∨} and ∈ {•, ♦, ∃, ∀}.
The following can then be verified by a simple induction on ϕ:
Lemma 4.4. Let ϕ ∈ L I , and X be any dynamic topological system. Suppose that · is an intuitionistic valuation and · C a classical valuation such that, for every atom p,
From Lemma 4.4 and the fact that DTL is computably enumerable [18] , we immediately obtain the following. Note that [18] considers a language without a universal modality, but adding it does not affect computable enumerability. Moreover, we proved in [19] that any satisfiable L C formula was also satisfiable on a model based on Q; as before, the universal modality can readily be incorporated, giving us the following: Theorem 4.6. Let ITL Q be the set of L I -formulas that are valid over the class of dynamical systems based on the rational numbers with the usual topology. Then,
However, DTL is undecidable [28] , and hence Theorem 4.5 does not settle the decidability of ITL c . It is not known whether the full ITL c is decidable; however, in the rest of this article we will show that this is indeed the case for ITL c ♦ .
Labeled Systems
Our decidability proof is based on (non-deterministic) quasimodels, introduced in [18] . In this section we will introduce labeled systems, which generalize both quasimodels and dynamical topological models, thus allowing us to view both of them in a unified framework. Let us write Σ ⋐ L I ♦ to indicate that Σ ⊆ L I ♦ is finite and is closed under subformulas. Given Σ ⋐ L I ♦ , we say that a set of formulas Φ ⊆ Σ is a Σ-type if:
The set of Σ-types will be denoted by T Σ . Note that T Σ is partially ordered by ⊆, and we will endow it with the up-set topology U ⊆ . For Φ ∈ T Σ , say that a formula ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ Σ is a defect of Φ if ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ Φ but ϕ ∈ Φ. The set of defects of Φ will be denoted ∂ Σ Φ, or simply ∂Φ when Σ is clear from context.
We say that a Σ-labeled space is a triple W = (|W|, T W , ℓ W ), where (|W|, T W ) is a topological space and ℓ W : |W| → T Σ a continuous function such that for all w ∈ |W|, whenever ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ ∂ℓ W (w) and U is any neighborhood of w, there is v ∈ U such that ϕ ∈ ℓ W (v) and ψ ∈ ℓ W (v). Such a v revokes ϕ ⇒ ψ.
The Σ-labeled space W falsifies ϕ ∈ L if ϕ ∈ Σ \ ℓ W (w) for some w ∈ |W|, and ℓ W is honest if, for every w ∈ |W| and every ∀ϕ ∈ Σ, we have that ∀ϕ ∈ ℓ W (w) if and only if ϕ ∈ ℓ W (v) for every v ∈ |W|.
If W is a labeled space, elements of |W| will sometimes be called worlds. As usual, we may write ℓ instead of ℓ W when this does not lead to confusion. Since we have endowed T Σ with the topology U ⊆ , the continuity of ℓ means that for every w ∈ |W|, there is a neighborhood U of w such that, whenever
Note that not every subset U of |W| gives rise to a substructure that is also a labeled space; however, this is the case when U is open.
For our purposes, a continuous relation on a topological space is a relation under which the preimage of any open set is open (note that this is not the standard definition of a contiuous relation, which is more involved). In the context of an Aleksandroff space with the down-set topology, a continuous relation S is one that satisfies the forward confluence property depicted in Figure 5 :
(1) for all •ϕ ∈ Σ, •ϕ ∈ Φ if and only if ϕ ∈ Ψ, and (2) for all ♦ϕ ∈ Σ, ♦ϕ ∈ Φ if and only if ϕ ∈ Φ or ♦ϕ ∈ Ψ. Likewise, a pair (w, v) of worlds in a labeled space W is sensible if (ℓ W (w), ℓ W (v)) is sensible.
A continuous relation S ⊆ |W| × |W| is sensible if every pair in S is sensible. Further, S is ω-sensible if it is serial and, whenever ♦ϕ ∈ ℓ(w), there are n ≥ 0 and v such that w S n v and ϕ ∈ ℓ(v). A labeled system is a labeled space W equipped with a sensible relation S W ⊆ |W|×|W|; if moreover ℓ W is honest and S W is ω-sensible, we say that W is a well Σ-labeled system.
Well-labeled systems generalize dynamical topological models in the following way. If X is a model and x ∈ |X|, assign a Σ-type ℓ X (x) to x given by
We also set S X = f X ; it is obvious that ℓ X is honest and S X is ω-sensible.
Example 5.4. Example 4.1 can be used to show that there are some difficulties when treating using labeled systems. In that example, we have that p = (−∞, 0). Thus, for instance, −1 ∈ p , but f (−1) = 0 ∈ p . If we wanted to label our model using Σ = {p, p}, we would have to set ℓ(−1) = {p, p} and ℓ(0) = {p}. Nevertheless, by the semantics of p, we know that f n (0) ∈ p for all n < ω, yet this information is not recorded in ℓ(0).
We could get around this issue by using classical semantics and the Gödel-Tarski translation, where ( p) = p. If we use Σ = sub( p), we would have p ∈ ℓ(−1), but also p ∈ ℓ(−1) and hence p ∈ ℓ(0). With this, 0 would 'remember' that all of its temporal successors must satisfy p. However, note that p ∈ ℓ(x) for any x > 0, and hence ℓ is no longer continuous. This is a problem for us, since the continuity of ℓ is used in an essential way (for example, in the proof of Lemma 9.7) to bound the size of our quasimodels.
Another useful class of labeled systems is given by quasimodels: Definition 5.5. A weak Σ-quasimodel is a Σ-labeled system Q such that T Q is locally finite, and equal to the down-set topology for a partial order Q . If moreover Q is a well Σ-labeled system, then we say that Q is a Σ-quasimodel. 
We include the full labels for completeness, but the most relevant formulas are displayed in boldface. In particular, observe that p belongs only to ℓ(w), and ϕ ∈ ℓ(u); the latter means that u falsifies ϕ, and thus ϕ is not valid over the class of sub(ϕ)-quasimodels. As we will see, this implies that ϕ is not valid over the class of dynamical systems. 
Producing Dynamic Topological Models from Quasimodels
Note that if Q is a quasimodel, then S Q is not necessarily a function, and thus we may not view Q directly as a dynamical topological model. However, we can extract a dynamical model − → Q from it via an unwinding construction, and we call the resulting structure the limit model of Q. The general idea is to consider infinite 'deterministic' paths on Q as points in the limit model; however, we will only keep those paths w with the property that, if ♦ϕ occurs in w, then ϕ must also occur at a later time. These are the realizing paths of Q.
Realizing paths.
A path in a quasimodel Q is any finite sequence (w n ) n<ξ with ξ ≤ ω such that w n S w n+1 whenever n + 1 < ξ. An infinite path w = (w n ) n<ω is realizing if for all n < ω and ♦ψ ∈ ℓ(w n ), there exists k ≥ n such that ψ ∈ ℓ(w k ).
Denote the set of realizing paths by | − → Q|. This will be the domain of the limit model of Q. The transition function on | − → Q| will be the 'shift' operator, defined by σ((w n ) n<ω ) = (w n+1 ) n<ω . This simply removes the first element in the sequence.
For our construction to work we must guarantee that there are 'enough' realizing paths. The following definition makes this precise: 5 Compare to [18] , where we use a very similar quasimodel to falsify the formula ψ = p → p, also valid over Aleksandroff systems. Note, however, that this ψ uses the classical semantics and thus we use a slightly more complicated example here. (w 0 , w 1 , . ., w m ) in Q can be extended to an (infinite) realizing path w = (w i ) i<ω ∈ E.
Lemma 6.2. Let Σ be a finite set of formulas closed under subformulas. If Q is a Σ-quasimodel, then | − → Q| is extensive.
Proof. It is obvious that | − → Q| is closed under σ, so we focus on (2). Let (w 0 , . . . , w m ) be a finite path and ψ 0 , . . . , ψ n be all formulas such that ♦ψ i ∈ ℓ(w m
Repeating this process, we obtain a path (w 0 , ..., w m , w m+1 . . . w m+kn ) realizing all ♦ψ i ∈ ℓ(w m ). Note that we may have k n = 0 (for example, if n = 0), in which case we choose arbitrary w m+1 such that w m S w m+1 , using the seriality of S. We then repeat the process beginning with (w 0 , ..., w m+kn ), and continue countably many times until an infinite realizing path is formed.
If A is an Aleksandroff system and v A w, then for all i < ω we also have that
A (w), and moreover f i A (v) i<ω is a realizing path. However, this does not always hold when we replace f A by a non-deterministic relation: if Q is a quasimodel, (w i ) i<ω is a realizing path, and v 0 Q w 0 , it may be that we cannot 'complete' v 0 to a realizing path v = (v i ) i<ω so that v i Q w i for all i. Fortunately, we do not need such a path in our limit model; it is sufficient to 'approximate' it by producing paths v so that v i Q w i for all i < n, provided n can be taken arbitrarily large. The next lemma will help us do this. We omit the proof, which follows by an easy induction using the continuity of S Q . Lemma 6.3. Let Q be a Σ-quasimodel, (w i ) i≤n a finite path, and v 0 be such that v 0 w 0 . Then, there exists a path (v i ) i≤n such that, for i ≤ n, v i w i .
In fact, the path v of Lemma 6.3 can be used to approximate an infinite path w in a rather precise way; to formalize this, we need to endow | − → Q| with a topology.
6.2. Limit models. If Σ ⋐ L I ♦ and Q is a Σ-quasimodel, the relation = Q induces a topology on |Q|, as we have seen before, by letting open sets be those which are downwards closed under . Likewise, induces a very different topology on | − → Q|, in a rather natural way: Lemma 6.4. For each w ∈ | − → Q| and n < ω, define
Then, the set B = ↓ n w : w ∈ | − → Q|, n < ω forms a topological basis on | − → Q|.
Proof. To check that it satisfies 2.2.1, note that it is obvious that, given any path w ∈ | − → Q|, there is a basic set containing it (say, ↓ 0 w), and hence | − → Q| = w∈| Now that we have equipped the set of realizing paths with a topology, we need a continuous transition function on it to have a dynamical system. Fortunately, our 'shift' operator σ will do the trick. Proof. Let w = (w i ) i<ω be a realizing path and ↓ n σ( w) be a neighborhood of σ( w). Then, if v ∈ ↓ n+1 w, w i v i for all i ≤ n + 1, so w i+1 v i+1 for all i ≤ n and σ( v) ∈ ↓ n σ( w). Hence σ(↓ n+1 w) ⊆ ↓ n σ( w), and σ is continuous.
Finally, we will use ℓ to define a valuation: if p is a propositional variable, set
With this, we are now ready to assign a dynamic topological model to each quasimodel:
to be the limit model of Q.
Of course this model is only useful if · ℓ matches with ℓ on all formulas of Σ, not just propositional variables. Fortunately, this turns out to be the case.
Proof. The proof goes by standard induction of formulas. The induction steps for ∧, ∨ are immediate; here we will only treat the cases for ⇒, •, ♦, .
, take the neighborhood ↓ 0 w 0 of w and consider v ∈ ↓ 0 w 0 , so that v 0 w 0 . Since Q is a Σ-labeled space, it follows that, if ψ ∈ ℓ(v 0 ), then θ ∈ ℓ(v 0 ); by the induction hypothesis, this means that if v ∈ ψ ℓ , then v ∈ θ ℓ . Since v ∈ ↓ 0 w 0 was arbitrary, it follows that w ∈ ψ ⇒ θ ℓ . On the other hand, if ψ ⇒ θ ∈ ℓ(w 0 ), there is v 0 w 0 such that ψ ∈ ℓ(v 0 ) but θ ∈ ℓ(v 0 ). Consider any basic neighborhood ↓ n w of w. Then, by Lemma 6.3, there exists a path (v 0 , ..., v n ) ⊆ |Q| such that, for all i ≤ n, v i w i and for i < n, v i S v i+1 . Because | − → Q| is extensive, (v i ) i≤n can be extended to a realizing path v ∈ | − → Q|. Then, v ∈ ↓ n w, and by induction hypothesis we have that v ∈ ϕ ℓ \ θ ℓ . Since n was arbitrary, we conclude that
Case 2: ϕ = •ψ. This case follows from the fact that (w 0 , w 1 ) is sensible and the induction hypothesis.
Case 3: ϕ = ♦ψ. Because w is a realizing path, we have that if ♦ψ ∈ ℓ(w 0 ), then ψ ∈ ℓ(w n ) for some n ≥ 0. We can use the induction hypothesis to conclude that σ n ( w) ∈ ψ ℓ , and so w ∈ ♦ψ ℓ . For the other direction, assume that ♦ψ ∈ ℓ(w 0 ). For all n, (w n , w n+1 ) is sensible so an easy induction shows that ψ ∈ ℓ(w n ) and σ n ( w) ∈ ψ ℓ ; since n was arbitrary, by the induction hypothesis we obtain w ∈ ♦ψ ℓ .
Case 4: ϕ = ∀ψ. If ∀ψ ∈ ℓ(w 0 ), then since ℓ is honest, we can use the induction hypothesis to conclude that v ∈ ψ ℓ for all v ∈ | − → Q|, and thus w ∈ ∀ψ ℓ . If ∀ψ ∈ ℓ(w 0 ), there is
. We can extend v 0 to a realizing path v and, by the induction hypothesis, v ∈ ψ ℓ , hence w ∈ ∀ψ ℓ .
We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section, which in particular implies that ITL c ♦ is sound for the class of quasimodels. Theorem 6.9. Let Σ ⋐ L I ♦ , and suppose that ϕ ∈ Σ is falsified in a Σ-quasimodel Q. Then, there exists w * ∈ | − → Q| such that w * ∈ ϕ ℓ .
Proof. Pick w * ∈ |Q| such that ϕ ∈ ℓ(w * ). By Lemma 6.2, w * can be extended to a realizing path w * . It follows from Lemma 6.8 that w * ∈ ϕ ℓ .
Example 6.10. Recall from Examples 3.6 and 5.6 that the formula
is valid over the class of Aleksandroff systems, but is falsifiable in a finite quasimodel. Thus it follows from Theorem 6.9 that ϕ is also falsifiable in a dynamical topological model. It is instructive to attempt to construct such a model directly, rather than appealing to the theorem. To this end, let us refute ϕ on Q. Define f : Q → Q by f (x) = x + 1, set
and let p = Q \ D. It is readily verified that 1 n+π ∈ Q for any n ∈ N, and hence
n+π , so that D is both closed and open. It follows from this that ∼p = D, and hence p ∨ ∼p = Q, so that ∀(p ∨ ∼p) = Q. In particular, 0 ∈ ∀(p ∨ ∼p) .
Moreover, one can check that (a) 0 ∈ ♦p , but (b) if x ∈ N, then x ∈ ♦p . It readily follows from (b) and Lemma 3.4 that 0 ∈ ∼∼♦p , and hence 0 ∈ ϕ .
In view of Example 3.6, we conclude that ITL c ♦ ITL e ♦ . Note that we use Q rather than R; this is because the latter is connected, in the following sense: Definition 6.11. A topological space X is disconnected if there are non-empty, disjoint open sets A, B ⊆ |X| such that A ∪ B = |X|; otherwise, X is connected.
It is well-known that R n is connected for any n < ω, but Q is not (for example, Q = (−∞, π) ∪ (π, ∞)). The disconectedness of Q is needed in Example 6.10, since
is valid over the class of connected spaces [40] , from which the validity of ϕ for systems based on a connected space is a straightforward consequence.
Moments
We have seen that any valid ϕ ∈ Σ is valid over the class of Σ-quasimodels. The converse is true, and for this we need to construct, given a model X falsifying ϕ, a quasimodel also falsifying ϕ. This quasimodel will be denoted X/Σ. The worlds of X/Σ will be called Σ-moments; the intuition is that a Σ-moment represents all the information that holds at the same 'moment of time'.
Definition 7.1. A Σ-moment is a Σ-labeled space w such that T w is the down-set topology of a partial order w , and (|w|, w ) is a finite tree with (unique) root r w . We will write ℓ Σ (w) instead of ℓ w (r w ). The set of Σ-moments is denoted M Σ .
Definition 7.2. Let w be a Σ-moment. For w ∈ |w|, let w[w] = w ↾ ↓w, i.e.,
We write w Σ v if v = w[w] for some w ∈ |w|.
We now wish to define a weak Σ-quasimodel M Σ over M Σ . For this, it remains to define a sensible relation on M Σ . Definition 7.3. Say w is a temporal successor of v, denoted v S Σ w, if there exists a sensible relation R ⊆ |v| × |w| such that r v R r w .
Proof. Suppose that w S Σ v, and let R ⊆ |v| × |w| be a sensible relation such that r v R r w . Then, the pair (ℓ w (r w ), ℓ v (r v )) is sensible because R is sensible, but it is equal to (ℓ Σ (w), ℓ Σ (v)), as needed for the first claim.
For the second, suppose further that w ′ Σ w. This means that w ′ = w[w] for some w ∈ |w|. Since R is sensible and |v| is open, we have that R −1 |v| is open as well, meaning in particular that w R v for some v ∈ |v|. Now consider R ′ = R ∩ (↓ w × ↓ v). Since ↓ v is open it follows that R ′ is continuous as well, and every pair in R ′ is sensible since every pair in R was. Moreover,
Lemma 7.4.2 essentially says that S Σ is a continuous relation with respect to the downset topology induced by Σ (see Figure 5 ). With this, we are ready to define our 'canonical' weak quasimodels.
♦ . Define M Σ to be the set of all finite Σ-moments, and set Henceforth, we may write , S, ℓ instead of Σ , S Σ , ℓ Σ when this does not lead to confusion. Observe that S Σ is not necessarily ω-sensible, and ℓ Σ is not necessarily honest, so M Σ is not a quasimodel as it stands. It does, however, contain substructures which are proper quasimodels, as we will see later.
7.1. Building moments from smaller moments. Often we will want to construct a Σ-moment from smaller moments. Here we will define the basic operation we will use to do this, and establish the conditions that the pieces must satisfy. Below, denotes a disjoint union.
Note that Φ U will not always be a moment, since ℓ [ Φ U ] thus defined might not be continuous, or it might not revoke some defect. To ensure that we do obtain a new moment, we need for (Φ, U ) to be a kit.
(1) A Σ-kit is a pair (Φ, U ), with Φ ∈ T Σ and U ⊆ M Σ finite, such that (a) Φ ⊆ ℓ(u) for all u ∈ U , and (b) whenever ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ ∂Φ, we have that there is u ∈ U such that ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ ℓ(u). 
Simulations
In order to prove that every falsifiable formula is falsifiable in a quasimodel, we need to represent dynamical models using quasimodels. Simulations are relations between quasimodels and models (or labeled spaces in general), and provide the basic tools we need to achieve such a representation.
♦ and X, Y be labeled spaces. A continuous relation χ ⊆ |X|×|Y| is a simulation if, for all (x, y) ∈ χ, ℓ X (x) = ℓ Y (y).
We will call the latter property label-preservation. Note that it may be that ℓ X is honest while ℓ Y is not, or vice-versa. However, this cannot happen with a total, surjective simulation:
♦ , X, Y are labeled spaces, and χ ⊆ |X| × |Y| is a total, surjective simulation. Then, ℓ X is honest if and only if ℓ Y is honest.
We omit the proof, which is straightforward. Simulations are useful for comparing the purely topological behavior of labeled structures. However, to compare their dynamic behavior, we need something a bit stronger. Suppose that χ is a dynamic simulation between a weak quasimodel W and a dynamical model X. It may be that S W is not ω-sensible; however, as we will see, we may use χ to extract an ω-sensible substructure from W.
Lemma 8.5. Let W, V be labeled systems and χ ⊆ |W| × |V| be a dynamical simulation. Then, if S V is ω-sensible, it follows that S W ↾ χ −1 (|V|) is also ω-sensible.
Proof. Let w ∈ χ −1 (|V|) and ♦ϕ ∈ ℓ W (w). Since w ∈ χ −1 (|V|), we can choose v 0 ∈ |V| such that w χ v 0 . Since ♦ϕ ∈ ℓ W (w), it follows that ♦ϕ ∈ ℓ V (v). Using the assumption that S V is ω-sensible, we may choose a sequence
Since χ is a dynamic simulation, we may recursively find w = w 0 S W w 1 S W w 2 S W . . . S W w n such that w i χ v i for each i ≤ n. We then have that ϕ ∈ ℓ W (w n ), as needed.
The seriality of S W ↾ χ −1 (|V|) is verified similarly, using the seriality of S V .
Suppose in particular that X is a model and x * ∈ |X| falsifies ϕ ∈ Σ. Then, if Q is a weak Σ-quasimodel and χ ⊆ |Q|×|X| is a surjective dynamical simulation such that w * χ x * for some w * ∈ |Q|, it follows Q ↾ χ −1 (|X|) is a quasimodel falsifying ϕ. Thus our strategy will be to show that there is a weak Σ-quasimodel Q such that, given any dynamical model X, there is a surjective dynamical simulation χ ⊆ |Q| × |X|. In principle we could take Q = M Σ , but since we wish to obtain finite quasimodels, it will be convenient to consider a finite substructure of M Σ . The elements of this structure will be the irreducible Σ-moments, as defined in the next section.
Irreducible Moments
In order to obtain finite quasimodels, we will restrict M Σ to moments that are, in a sense, no bigger than they need to be. To be precise, we want them to be minimal with respect to , which we define below, along with some other useful relations between moments. v) ) for all v ∈ |v| and π 2 = π. We say that w is a reduct of v and π is a reduction.
Note that the condition π 2 = π is equivalent to requiring π(w) = w whenever w ∈ |w|.
Proof.
(1) Let π : |v| → |w| be a reduction. Observe that r w = π(r v ), sice if w ∈ |w|, from w r w we obtain w = π(w) π(r w ), so that r w , π(r v ) are both the greatest element of |w| and thus equal. It follows that Proof.
(1) Choose v w such that #|v| is minimal. Then, if u v, we have that #|u| ≤ #|v| and, by Lemma 9.2.3, u w; hence by minimality, #|u| = #|v|, and thus u = v. Since u was arbitrary, v is irreducible. (2) If v w, then v = w[w] for some w ∈ |w|. Let π : ↓ w w → ↓ w w be a reduction, and
It is readily checked that ρ is a reduction, and since w is irreducible, it must be surjective. However, this is only possible if π was already surjective. (3) Assuming otherwise, let h : |u| → |v| be an isomorphism; then, define π : |w| → |w|
It is readily checked that π is a reduction onto a strictly smaller moment.
The set of irreducible moments forms a weak quasimodel, much like the set of moments M Σ .
♦ . Define I Σ to be the set of all irreducible Σ-moments, and set
Let us write w 0 v if w v and v is irreducible. Then we have:
♦ . Then, (1) I Σ is a weak Σ-quasimodel, and (2) 0 ⊆ |I Σ | × |M Σ | is a surjective, dynamic simulation.
Proof. It is immediate from Lemma 9.4.2 that I Σ is open, and thus I Σ is a weak quasimodel by Lemma 5.2. Surjectivity of 0 is Lemma 9.4.1, label-preservation is Lemma 9.2.1, continuity is Lemma 9.2.2, and dynamicity is Lemma 9.2.4.
We wish to show that I Σ is always finite. For this, we will first show that irreducible frames cannot be too 'tall'. To make this precise, let us define the height of w as the largest n so that there exists a chain w 1 w w 2 . . . w w n and write n = hgt(w).
Lemma 9.7. Let w be an irreducible Σ-moment and w, v ∈ |w|. Then, if w v and ℓ(w) = ℓ(v), it follows that w = v.
Proof.
We proceed by induction on hgt(w): if w = r w , then by Lemma 9.4.2, w[w] is irreducible and we can apply the induction hypothesis. So, we may assume otherwise. We may also assume that v ≺ 1 r w ; for, if r w = v, there is nothing to prove, and if not, choose
It is readily seen that π is a reduction and v ∈ π|w|, contradicting the irreducibility of w.
The following is then immediate from Lemma 9.7: Corollary 9.8. If Σ ⋐ L and w is an irreducible Σ-moment, then hgt(w) ≤ #Σ + 1.
Next we will give a bound on the size of irreducible moments. Our bound will be superexponential; recall that the superexponential 2 m n is defined by recursion on n by 2 m 0 = m and 2 m n+1 = 2 2 m n . We begin with a useful inequality:
s+1 . Proof. We prove, by induction on n, that there are at most 2 ns n irreducible moments with height n. Note that there are no moments of height 0, and 0 = 2 0s 0 . So, we may assume n ≥ 1. Any irreducible of height at most n is of the form (n−1)s n ≤ 2 ns n such w. The lemma then follows by choosing n = s + 1, the greatest value that hgt(w) could take. Now that we know that I Σ is finite, it would be convenient if, whenever χ is a simulation and w is any Σ-moment such that w χ x, we could replace w by some irreducible w ′ w and still have that w ′ χ x. The following operations on simulations will help us achieve this. In other words, wχ x means that there is v such that w v χ x. Let us see that these operations indeed produce new simulations. 
Proof. Thatχ is a simulation is immediate from Lemma 8.4.1, and it is easily seen that χ 0 is a simulation using Lemma 8.4.2. For claim 2a, it is obvious that χ 0 (I Σ ) ⊆ χ(M Σ ). For the other inclusion, assume that χ is reductive. Consider x ∈ χ(M Σ ), so that there is w ∈ M Σ with w χ x. By Lemma 9.6, 0 is surjective, so we can pick w ′ with w ′ 0 w; since χ is reductive, it follows that w ′ χ x, and hence x ∈ χ 0 (I Σ ), as needed.
For Claim 2b, choose v ′ 0 v, so that, as above, v ′ χ 0 f X (x). Meanwhile, since w w and w S Σ v, we can use Lemma 9.2.4 to conclude that w S Σ v ′ .
Simulating Dynamical Systems
Our work with irreducibles shows that if we can construct a surjective, dynamic simulation on M Σ , then we immediately get a surjective, dynamic simulation on I Σ , which we can then use to construct finite quasimodels. In this section, we will show how such simulations can be found; specifically, we will show that maximal simulations have all required properties. 
is a simulation, and clearly this is the greatest simulation. By Lemma 9.12,χ * is also a simulation, henceχ * ⊆ χ * , and thus χ * is reductive.
Our goal is to prove that χ * gives us a surjective, dynamic simulation. The following lemma will be essential in proving this.
♦ , X be a model, and χ ⊆ M Σ × |X| be a simulation. Suppose that Φ ⊆ Σ and A ⊆ M Σ are a Σ-kit (as in Definition 7.8), and that there is x * ∈ |X| such that (1) ℓ X (x * ) = Φ, and (2) for all w ∈ A, x * ∈ χ(w).
is also a simulation.
Proof. Note, first, that ζ is label-preserving; let us prove that it is also continuous.
Consider an arbitrary open set U ⊆ |X|. We must show that ζ −1 (U ) is open. So, let w ∈ ζ −1 (U ), and assume that v w. Let us see that v ∈ ζ −1 (U ). Obviously the latter holds if w = v, so we assume v ≺ w. Pick x ∈ U such that w ζ x. If x = x * or w = Φ A , then we already have w χ x, and hence v ∈ χ −1 (U ) ⊆ ζ −1 (U ). So, assume that x = x * and w = Φ A . Then, there is v ′ ∈ A such that v ≺ v ′ w. By assumption, x * ∈ χ(v ′ ); hence, since U is open, there is y ∈ U such that v ′ χ y. But χ is continuous and U is a neighborhood of y, so there is z ∈ U such that v χ z, hence v ζ z as needed.
Proposition 10.3. For any model X and Σ ⋐ L I ♦ , χ * ⊆ M Σ × |X| is surjective. Proof. Since we know that χ * is reductive, it suffices to show that a reductive simulation that is not surjective is not maximal. Thus, let χ ⊆ M Σ × |X| be any reductive simulation. Say a point x ∈ X is bad if it does not lie in the range of χ. We claim that χ is not maximal if there are bad points.
If there are bad points, let x * ∈ |X| be a bad point such that ℓ(x * ) is ⊆-maximal among all bad points. Let U * be a neighborhood of x * minimizing #χ −1 0 (U * ) (which is finite by Lemma 9.10), and such that U * ⊆ ϕ X for all ϕ ∈ ℓ(x * ). We claim that for each defect δ = ϕ ⇒ ψ ∈ ∂Φ, there is u δ ∈ χ −1 0 (U * ) revoking δ. To see this, note that by the semantics of ⇒, there is x δ ∈ U * such that x δ ∈ ϕ X \ ψ X . But, since x δ ∈ U * , it follows that ℓ(x δ ) ⊇ ℓ(x * ), and since ϕ ∈ ℓ(x δ ) \ ℓ(x * ), the inclusion is strict. By maximality of ℓ(x * ) we have that x δ is not bad, hence x δ ∈ χ(v) for some v ∈ M Σ . By Lemma 9.4, there is an irreducible u δ v, and since χ is reductive, u δ χ x δ , so that u δ ∈ χ −1 0 (U * ), as desired. Let A be the set of all u δ such that δ is a defect of ℓ(x * ). By Lemma 7.9, w * = ℓ(x * ) A is a Σ-moment, and we can set
A , x * . By Lemma 10.2, ζ is a simulation. Since x * was bad, χ ζ, as desired.
Proposition 10.4. Given a model X, χ * is a dynamic simulation.
Proof. The proof follows much the same structure as that of Proposition 10.3. Let χ be a reductive simulation, which in view of Proposition 10.3, we may assume to be surjective. Suppose further that χ is not dynamic; we will show that it cannot be maximal.
Say that x fails for w if w χ x but there is no v ∈ χ −1 f X (x) such that w S Σ v. We will show that χ is not maximal if any point fails for any moment. If this were the case, pick w * of minimal height such that some point x * fails for it. Let V * be a neighborhood of f X (x * ) such that #χ −1 0 (V * ) is minimal, and V * ⊆ ϕ X whenever ϕ ∈ ℓ(f X (x * )). As before, for each defect δ of ℓ(f X (x * )), choose u δ ∈ χ −1 0 (V * ) revoking δ. Next, for each v such that v ≺ w, we claim there is v ′ ∈ χ −1 0 (V * ) such that v S Σ v ′ . To see this, using the continuity of f X , let U be a neighborhood of x * such that f X (U ) ⊆ V * . Since χ is continuous, there is x v ∈ U such that v χ x v . Since hgt(v) < hgt(w), by the induction hypothesis, there is v ′′ such that v S Σ v ′′ and v ′′ χ f X (x v ). But χ is reductive, so that by Lemma 9.12.2b, there is
Then, by Lemma 7.9,
is a Σ-moment and w * S Σ v * by Lemma 7.9.2. We can then set ζ = χ ∪ {(v * , f X (x * ))} . As before, ζ is a simulation which properly contains χ. Therefore, χ is not maximal.
We are now ready to prove our main result.
Theorem 10.6. If X is a dynamical topological model falsifying ϕ ∈ Σ, then X/Σ is a Σ-quasimodel falsifying ϕ.
Proof. By Propositions 10.3 and 10.4, χ * is a surjective dynamic simulation, so by Lemmas 8.2 and 8.5, X/Σ is a Σ-quasimodel. Now, pick x * ∈ |X| \ ϕ X . By Proposition 10.3, χ * 0 is surjective, so there exists w * ∈ I Σ such that x * ∈ χ * (w * ), hence ϕ ∈ Σ \ ℓ(w * ). This shows that that X/Σ falsifies ϕ, as desired.
With this, we our main decidability result is immediate.
Theorem 10.7. ITL c ♦ is decidable. Proof. Taking Σ = sub(ϕ), we see by Theorems 6.9 and 10.6 that ϕ is falsifiable if and only if it is falsifiable on a Σ-quasimodel of the form Q = X/Σ, which is a substructure of I Σ . Since Q has at most 2 ( ϕ +1) ϕ ϕ worlds, it remains to search for a quasimodel satisfying this bound.
Special Classes of Systems
Now that we have seen that ITL c ♦ is decidable, let us turn our attention to its capacity to reason about recurrence phenomena. The operator ♦ allows us to express properties of the asymptotic behavior of dynamical topological systems; this behavior is often more interesting when these systems have additional structural properties. We will discuss two special classes of systems which exhibit non-trivial asymptotic behavior, and show that ITL c ♦ can describe this behavior in both cases. We begin by discussing minimal systems.
• f (x)
• x απ Figure 6 : If α is irrational, then a rotation by απ gives rise to a minimal system on the unit circle.
11.1. Minimal systems. Minimal systems, introduced in [9] , are dynamical systems that exhibit characteristic asymptotic behavior which can be captured in the language of DTL.
We will recall a few basic properties for minimal dynamical systems; a deeper treatment can be found in a text such as [1] . If X is a dynamical system and Y ⊆ |X| is such that
, where T X ↾ Y is the subspace topology on Y induced by T X ; to be precise,
Definition 11.1. Let X and Y be dynamical systems. We will say that Y is a subsystem of X, written Y ≤ X, if there exists a non-empty closed set Y ⊆ |X| which is closed under f X and such that Y = X ↾ Y .
The dynamical system X is minimal if it is minimal under ≤; that is, if it contains no proper subsystems.
While it is not true in general that a dynamical system X has a minimal subsystem, the following theorem of Birkhoff [9] shows that this is the case if we assume X to be compact. The result is proven using Zorn's lemma. An alternative, and sometimes more useful, characterization of minimal systems is given by the following: Proposition 11.3. A dynamical system X is minimal if and only if the orbit of every point is dense in |X|.
Proof. Suppose that X is minimal and let x ∈ |X|. Let Y be the the closure of the orbit of x: Y = f n X (x) : n < ω . It is not hard to check that Y is a closed subset of X that is closed under f X ; since X is minimal, it follows that Y = |X|, which means that the orbit of x is dense in |X|. Now, suppose X is not minimal, and let Z |X| be non-empty, closed, and f X -closed. Note that Z itself cannot be dense since it is already closed. Then, it is clear that for any x ∈ Z, the orbit of x lies in Z, and since Z is closed, the closure of the orbit of x is also a subset of Z. Thus the orbit of x is not dense in |X|.
An example of a minimal system is given by a rotation of the unit circle S 1 by an angle απ, where α is irrational. It is well-known that under such a rotation, the orbit of every point of S 1 is dense, and hence this gives us a minimal system (see Figure 11 .1). Note that minimal systems do not have to be connected or surjective; Figure 7 gives an example of a minimal system that is neither, and compact, Hausorff examples can be found in [6, 11] .
The dynamic topological logic of minimal systems is well-understood [20] :
Theorem 11.4. Let X be a dynamical system. Then, X is minimal if and only if
Theorem 11.5. Let DTL m denote the set of valid formulas of L C over the class of minimal systems. Then, DTL m is decidable.
As we will see, analogous results hold for L I . First, observe that decidability is readily inherited from the classical setting: Theorem 11.6. Let ITL m denote the set of valid formulas of L I over the class of minimal systems. Then, ITL m is decidable.
Proof. We have that ϕ ∈ L I is valid over the class of minimal systems if and only if ϕ is. Thus, the validity problem of ITL m can be reduced to that of DTL m ; since the latter is decidable, so is the former.
Example 11.7. Figure 7 gives an example of an Aleksandroff dynamical system m, where f m is not open. Note that the set {w, z} is dense, and the orbit of every point contains these two points, so the system is minimal. If we let p = {y, z} and q = {z}, then it is readily Remark 11.8. The set of valid formulas of DTL m is not primitive recursively decidable, hence the above argument does not settle whether ITL m is. One could combine the proof of Theorem 10.7 with the proof in [20] of Theorem 11.5 to obtain a primitive recursive decision procedure; nevertheless, the procedure thus obtained would most likely remain superexponential without some non-trivial modifications.
As for characterizing minimality in L I (indeed, in L I ♦ ), we may actually do this more succinctly:
Theorem 11.9. Let X be a dynamical system. Then, X is minimal if and only if X |= ∃p ⇒ ♦p.
(11.1)
Proof. First assume that X is any minimal dynamical system and · is any valuation on X.
Suppose that x ∈ ∃p . Then, p is non-empty and open; since the orbit of x is dense, it follows that f n X (x) ∈ p for some n, that is, x ∈ ♦p . Conversely, if X is not minimal, let Y be a non-empty, proper, closed, f X -closed subset of |X|. Then, if · is any valuation satisfying p = |X| \ Y and x ∈ Y , it is not hard to check that x ∈ ∃p ⇒ ♦p .
As a corollary, we obtain the following:
Corollary 11.10. Over the class of minimal systems, ♦ is definable by ♦ϕ ⇔ ∃ϕ.
In view of Lemma 3.7, we may also define ♦ϕ ⇔ ∼∀∼ϕ, and thus the language L I ↾ {•, ∀} is equally expressive as L I ♦ . This makes L I ↾ {•, ∀} (i.e., the language with modalities •, ∀), or even L I ↾ {•, ∃}, be particularly attractive for reasoning about minimal dynamical systems.
11.2. Poncaré recurrence. Finally, we turn our attention to probability-preserving systems. The DTL of such systems is not as well-understood as that of minimal systems; nevertheless, the Poincaré recurrence theorem, one of the motivations for the study of DTL, holds in this class of systems. Definition 11.11. A dynamical system X is probabilty preserving if there exists a probability measure π on |X| such that (1) if U ⊆ |X| is open and non-empty, then U is measurable and π(U ) = 0; (2) for every measurable set Y ⊆ |X|, we have π(Y ) = π(f −1 X (Y )). Probability-preserving systems have the following property, discovered by Poincaré [39] ; a more modern presentation can be found in [1] .
Theorem 11.12. If X is a probability-preserving system and U ⊆ |X| is open, then U contains a recurrent point, i.e. there is x ∈ U such that f n X (x) ∈ U for some n > 0. As observed by Kremer and Mints in [32] , Poincaré recurrence can readily be expressed in the language of DTL.
is valid over the class of probability-preserving systems, but not valid in general.
Poincaré recurrence is also expressible in L I ♦ . Below, say that a dynamical system X is Poincaré recurrent if every non-empty open set U ⊆ |X| contains a recurrent point.
• f (x) • x ϑ Figure 8 : A rotation f of a disk by an angle ϑ gives rise to a probability-preserving system, where the probability of a set is defined to be proportional to its area. Note that ϑ no longer needs to be an irrational multiple of π, unlike in Figure 11 .1. Moreover, such a system is not minimal, as (for example) the dashed circle is a closed, f -closed subsystem.
Theorem 11.14. A dynamical system X is Poincaré recurrent if and only if
Proof. First assume that X is Poincaré recurrent, and let · be any valuation on X. Let U ⊆ p be open and non-empty. Then, U contains a recurrent point; that is, there are x ∈ U and n > 0 such that f n X (x) ∈ U . It follows that x ∈ •♦p , and since U ⊆ p was arbitrary, using Lemma 3.4 we conclude that X |= p ⇒ ∼∼•♦p.
Conversely, if X is not Poincaré recurrent, let U ⊆ |X| be a non-empty open set with no recurrent point. Set p = U and choose x ∈ U ; then, it is easy to check that x ∈ •♦p . Since x ∈ U is arbitrary we conclude that U ∩ •♦p = ∅, hence •♦p = ∅ is not dense in p , and X |= p ⇒ ∼∼•♦p.
Remark 11.15. Despite being able to capture minimality and Poincaré recurrence, L I has less expressive power than L C , since the former can only reason about open sets. Thus, we should expect the intuitionistic language to have some limitations. One example of this might be given by strong Poincaré recurrence.
Say that a dynamical system X is strongly Poincaré recurrent if every non-empty open U ⊆ |X| has an infinitely recurrent point; that is, there is x ∈ U such that f n X (x) ∈ U for infinitely many n. Then, Theorem 11.12 can be strengthened to conclude that any probability-preserving is strongly Poincaré recurrent.
One can then reason as in the proof of Theorem 11.14 to conclude that X |= p → ♦p if and only X it is strongly Poincaré recurrent. However, given that the set of infinitely recurrent points need not be open, it is unlikely that L I can characterize strongly Poincaré recurrent systems in this fashion.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented ITL c ♦ , a variant of Kremer's intuitionistic dynamic topological logic, and shown it to be decidable; we summarize the known decidability results in We also showed that the language of ITL c ♦ is expressive enough to characterize minimality and Poincaré recurrence, two key properties which sparked interest in DTL. This makes ITL c ♦ arguably be the first decidable logic suitable for reasoning about non-trivial asymptotic behavior of dynamical topological systems. Nevertheless, our techniques are model-theoretic and do not yield an axiomatization, raising the following:
A separate strategy for finding tractable fragments could be to impose additional syntactical restrictions to L I ♦ , such as limiting the number of embedded implications. Minimality is characterized using only one implication, and Poincaré recurrence uses three, 6 so that such restricted systems might suffice for applications. This strategy has been successfully employed to obtain tractable fragments of the polymodal provability logic GLP [7, 12] , which, like DTL, is topologically complete but not Kripke complete [8] . This raises the following: Question 12.3. Can tractable and useful variants of ITL c be obtained by (a) using different spatial algebras, or (b) restricting the syntax to suitable fragments?
Most of the classes of systems we have considered give rise to logics different from ITL c , as depicted in Figure 9 . All inclusions in the figure follow from one class being contained in the other, except for ITL Q ⊆ ITL c , which is Theorem 4.6. Moreover:
(1) ITL h is the only logic in the figure containing ∀•p ⇒ ∀p, which is valid over systems with a surjective function. (2) ITL e and ITL p contain p ⇒ • p, which is not in ITL R n (Example 4.1). They also contain (6.1) [10] , which is not in ITL h , given that the function in Example 6.10 uses a homeomorphism. We leave a full proof of these claims to the reader; one useful counter-example for this is given by Figure 7 , which presents a disconnected, non- Figure 9 is complete (in the sense that all inclusions are shown), aside from possibly (a), and remains complete if we replace the logics by the respective L I ♦ fragments, except for possibly (a) or (b). Given that these logics are mostly distinct, it is an interesting open problem whether intuitionistic temporal logics over special classes of systems are more feasible than their classical counterparts. For example, DTL m is decidable, unlike the unrestricted DTL: perhaps ITL m ♦ also has lower complexity than ITL c ♦ ? Similarly, it is not known if DTL over Poincaré recurrent systems is decidable, but settling the decidability of intuitionistic temporal logic over this class may be a more accessible problem.
Question 12.5. Which of the unknown logics of Table 2 Figure 9 : Inclusions among logics we have considered, with notation as in Table 2 .
Question 12.6. Is ITL c decidable?
